vention all the rules of a blockaded port. The
message finally sent to the German Admiral is reticently described
by Dewey himself, but is said to have been to the effect that, if
the German admiral wanted a fight, "he could have it right now."
On the day of the surrender of Manila the British and the Japanese
ships in the harbor took a position between the American and the
German squadrons. This was just after the seizure of Kiao-chau,
at a time when Germany was vigorously pushing out for "a place in
the sun." But for the American commander's quiet yet firm stand,
with British support, the United States might have encountered
more serious complications in taking over 127,000 square miles of
archipelago in the eastern world, with important trade interests,
a lively insurrection, and a population of 7 million.
_The Santiago Campaign_
In the Atlantic, where it was the American policy not to carry
their offensive beyond Spain's West Indies possessions, events
moved more slowly. Rear Admiral Sicard, in command of the North
Atlantic squadron based on Key West, was retired in March for physical
disability and succeeded by William T. Sampson, who stepped up
naturally from senior captain in the squadron and was already
distinguished for executive ability and knowledge of ordnance. Sampson's
first proposal was, in the event of hostilities, a bombardment of
Havana, a plan approved by all his captains and showing a confidence
inspired perhaps by coastal operations in the Civil War; but this
was properly vetoed by the Department on the ground that no ships
should be risked against shore defenses until they had struck at
the enemy's naval force and secured control of the sea. An earlier
memorandum from Secretary Long, outlining plans for a blockade
of Cuba, had been based on suggestions from Rear Admiral (then
Captain) Mahan,[1] and his strategic insight may have guided this
decision. On April 22, Sampson, now acting rear admiral, placed
his force off Havana and established a close blockade over 100
miles on the northern coast.
[Footnote 1: Goode, WITH SAMPSON THROUGH THE WAR, p. 19.]
The problem for American strategy was now Cervera's "fleet in
being,"--inferior in force but a menace until destroyed or put out
of action--which, as before stated, left the Cape Verde Islands
on April 29, for a destination unknown. A bombardment of cities on
the American coast or a raid on the North Atlantic trade routes
was within the realm
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