rotecting her
transports and by the necessity--which she felt keenly--of avoiding
losses in battle which would leave her helpless upon the possible
advent of Russia's Baltic reserves.
Russia's main naval strength in the East consisted of 7 battleships
and 3 armored cruisers, presenting a combined broadside of 100
guns against Japan's 124. The support of the Black Sea fleet was
denied by the attitude of England, which would prevent violation
of the agreement restricting it from passing the Dardanelles. The
Baltic fleet, however, was an important though distant reserve
force, a detachment from which was actually in the Red Sea on its
way east at the outbreak of war.
Just as clearly as it was Japan's policy to force the fighting on
land, so it should have been Russia's to prevent Japan's movement
of troops by aggressive action at sea. This called for concentration
of force and concentration of purpose. But neither was evident in
the Russian plan of campaign, which betrayed confusion of thought
and a traditional leaning toward the defensive--acceptance on the
one hand of what has been called "fortress fleet" doctrine, that
fleets exist to protect bases and can serve this purpose by being
shut up in them; and on the other hand of exaggerated "fleet in
being" theory, that the mere presence of the Russian fleet, though
inactive, would prevent Japan's use of the sea. Thus in October,
1903, Witjeft, chief of the Port Arthur naval staff, declared that
a landing of Japanese troops either in the Liao-tung or the Korean
Gulf was "impossible so long as our fleet is not destroyed." Just
as Russia's total force was divided between east and west, so her
eastern force was divided between Vladivostok and Port Arthur, with
the Japanese in central position between. Three armored cruisers
were in the northern port, and 7 battleships in the other; and all
Russia's efforts after war broke out were vainly directed toward
remedying this faulty disposition before it began. The whole Russian
fleet in the East, moreover, was, it is said, badly demoralized and
unready for war, owing chiefly to bureaucratic corruption and to
the fact that not merely its strategical direction but its actual
command was vested in the Viceroy, Alexieff, with headquarters on
shore.
_Operations Around Port Arthur_
On January 3, 1904, Japan presented practically an ultimatum; on
February 6 broke off diplomatic relations; on February 8 declared
war; and on the sa
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