Cervera's arrival in Santiago. Since Havana could not be uncovered,
he sent instructions to Schley--at first discretionary, and then,
as the reports were confirmed, more imperative--to blockade the
eastern port. Though the commander of the Flying Squadron received
the latter orders on the 23d, he had seen smoke in Cienfuegos harbor
and still believed he had Cervera cornered there. Accordingly he
delayed until evening of the next day. Then, after reaching Santiago,
he cabled on the 27th that he was returning to Key West to coal,
though he had a collier with him and stringent orders to the contrary;
and it was not until the 29th that he actually established the
Santiago Blockade. Sampson, his superior in command (though not
his senior in the captains' list), later declared his conduct at
this time "reprehensible"[1]--possibly too harsh a term, for the
circumstances tried judgment and leadership in the extreme. Cervera
found Santiago destitute of facilities for refitting. Yet the fact
remains that he had 10 days in which to coal and get away. "We
cannot," writes Admiral Mahan, "expect ever again to have an enemy
so inept as Spain showed herself to be."[1*]

[Footnote 1: Letter to Secretary, July 10, 1898, SAMPSON-SCHLEY
DOCUMENTS, p. 136: "Had the commodore left his station at that
time he probably would have been court-martialed, so plain was
his duty.... This reprehensible conduct I cannot separate from
his subsequent conduct, and for this reason I ask you to do him
ample justice on this occasion." A court of inquiry later decided
that Commodore Schley's service up to June 1 was characterized
by "vacillation, dilatoriness, and lack of enterprise."]

[Footnote 1*: LESSONS OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN, p. 157.]

The "bottling up" of Cervera cleared the situation, and the navy
could now concentrate on a task still difficult but well defined.
Sampson brought his force to Santiago on June 1, and assumed immediate
command. A close blockade was instituted such as against adequate
torpedo and mine defenses would have been highly dangerous even
at that day. Three picket launches were placed about a mile off
shore, three small vessels a mile further out, and beyond these
the 5 or 6 major units, under steam and headed toward the entrance
in a carefully planned disposition to meet any attempt at escape.
At night a battleship stood in and played its searchlight directly
on the mouth of the channel. The latter was six miles in length,
wi