ich is not heard becomes heard; that which is not perceived,
perceived; that which is not known, known?' (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 3.) This
passage intimates that through the cognition of one thing everything
else, even if (previously) unknown, becomes known. Now the knowledge of
everything is possible through the cognition of the material cause,
since the effect is non-different from the material cause. On the other
hand, effects are not non-different from their operative causes; for we
know from ordinary experience that the carpenter, for instance, is
different from the house he has built.--The illustrative example
referred to is the one mentioned (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 4), 'My dear, as by one
clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification (i.e.
the effect) being a name merely which has its origin in speech, while
the truth is that it is clay merely;' which passage again has reference
to the material cause. The text adds a few more illustrative instances
of similar nature, 'As by one nugget of gold all that is made of gold is
known; as by one pair of nail-scissors all that is made of iron is
known.'--Similar promissory statements are made in other places also,
for instance, 'What is that through which if it is known everything else
becomes known?' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 3.) An illustrative instance also is
given in the same place, 'As plants grow on the earth' (I, 1,
7).--Compare also the promissory statement in B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 6, 'When
the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known, then all this is
known;' and the illustrative instance quoted (IV, 5, 8), 'Now as the
sounds of a drum if beaten cannot be seized externally, but the sound is
seized when the drum is seized or the beater of the drum.'--Similar
promissory statements and illustrative instances which are to be found
in all Vedanta-texts are to be viewed as proving, more or less, that
Brahman is also the material cause of the world. The ablative case also
in the passage, 'That from whence (yata/h/) these beings are born,' has
to be considered as indicating the material cause of the beings,
according to the grammatical rule, Pa/n/. I, 4, 30.--That Brahman is at
the same time the operative cause of the world, we have to conclude from
the circumstance that there is no other guiding being. Ordinarily
material causes, indeed, such as lumps of clay and pieces of gold, are
dependent, in order to shape themselves into vessels and ornaments, on
extraneous operative caus
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