as
such must be assumed to have a seen result (not an unseen one like
dharma)[264]. Moreover, the scriptural passage, 'He is to be heard, to
be thought,' enjoins thought in addition to hearing, and thereby shows
that Reasoning also is to be resorted to with regard to Brahman. Hence
an objection founded on Reasoning is set forth, 'Not so, on account of
the difference of nature of this (effect).'--The Vedantic opinion that
the intelligent Brahman is the material cause of this world is untenable
because the effect would in that case be of an altogether different
character from the cause. For this world, which the Vedantin considers
as the effect of Brahman, is perceived to be non-intelligent and impure,
consequently different in character from Brahman; and Brahman again is
declared by the sacred texts to be of a character different from the
world, viz. intelligent and pure. But things of an altogether different
character cannot stand to each other in the relation of material cause
and effect. Such effects, for instance, as golden ornaments do not have
earth for their material cause, nor is gold the material cause of
earthen vessels; but effects of an earthy nature originate from earth
and effects of the nature of gold from gold. In the same manner this
world, which is non-intelligent and comprises pleasure, pain, and
dulness, can only be the effect of a cause itself non-intelligent and
made up of pleasure, pain, and dulness; but not of Brahman which is of
an altogether different character. The difference in character of this
world from Brahman must be understood to be due to its impurity and its
want of intelligence. It is impure because being itself made up of
pleasure, pain, and dulness, it is the cause of delight, grief,
despondency, &c., and because it comprises in itself abodes of various
character such as heaven, hell, and so on. It is devoid of intelligence
because it is observed to stand to the intelligent principle in the
relation of subserviency, being the instrument of its activity. For the
relation of subserviency of one thing to another is not possible on the
basis of equality; two lamps, for instance, cannot be said to be
subservient to each other (both being equally luminous).--But, it will
be said, an intelligent instrument also might be subservient to the
enjoying soul; just as an intelligent servant is subservient to his
master.--This analogy, we reply, does not hold good, because in the case
of servant a
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