eupon the opinion of others is mentioned, 'There are many
persons, O King, according to the Sa@nkhya and Yoga philosophers;' that
opinion is controverted 'just as there is one place of origin, (viz. the
earth,) for many persons, so I will proclaim to you that universal
person raised by his qualities;' and, finally, it is declared that there
is one universal Self, 'He is the internal Self of me, of thee, and of
all other embodied beings, the internal witness of all, not to be
apprehended by any one. He the all-headed, all-armed, all-footed,
all-eyed, all-nosed one moves through all beings according to his will
and liking.' And Scripture also declares that there is one universal
Self, 'When to a man who understands the Self has become all things,
what sorrow, what trouble can there be to him who once beheld that
unity?' (I/s/. Up 7); and other similar passages. All which proves that
the system of Kapila contradicts the Veda, and the doctrine of Manu who
follows the Veda, by its hypothesis of a plurality of Selfs also, not
only by the assumption of an independent pradhana. The authoritativeness
of the Veda with regard to the matters stated by it is independent and
direct, just as the light of the sun is the direct means of our
knowledge of form and colour; the authoritativeness of human dicta, on
the other hand, is of an altogether different kind, as it depends on an
extraneous basis (viz. the Veda), and is (not immediate but) mediated by
a chain of teachers and tradition.
Hence the circumstance that the result (of our doctrine) is want of room
for certain Sm/ri/tis, with regard to matters contradicted by the Veda,
furnishes no valid objection.--An additional reason for this our opinion
is supplied by the following Sutra.
2. And on account of the non-perception of the others (i.e. the effects
of the pradhana, according to the Sa@nkhya system).
The principles different from the pradhana, but to be viewed as its
modifications which the (Sa@nkhya) Sm/ri/ti assumes, as, for instance,
the great principle, are perceived neither in the Veda nor in ordinary
experience. Now things of the nature of the elements and the sense
organs, which are well known from the Veda, as well as from experience,
may be referred to in Sm/ri/ti; but with regard to things which, like
Kapila's great principle, are known neither from the Veda nor from
experience--no more than, for instance, the objects of a sixth
sense--Sm/ri/ti is altogether imposs
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