less other Sm/ri/tis which
declare themselves in favour of the said doctrine. These latter
Sm/ri/ti-texts we will quote in what follows. In one passage the highest
Brahman is introduced as the subject of discussion, 'That which is
subtle and not to be known;' the text then goes on, 'That is the
internal Self of the creatures, their soul,' and after that remarks
'From that sprang the Unevolved, consisting of the three gu/n/as, O best
of Brahma/n/as.' And in another place it is said that 'the Unevolved is
dissolved in the Person devoid of qualities, O Brahma/n/a.'--Thus we
read also in the Pura/n/a, 'Hear thence this short statement: The
ancient Naraya/n/a is all this; he produces the creation at the due
time, and at the time of reabsorption he consumes it again.' And so in
the Bhagavadgita also (VII, 6), 'I am the origin and the place of
reabsorption of the whole world.' And Apastamba too says with reference
to the highest Self, 'From him spring all bodies; he is the primary
cause, he is eternal, he is unchangeable' (Dharma Sutra I, 8, 23, 2). In
this way Sm/ri/ti, in many places, declares the Lord to be the efficient
as well as the material cause of the world. As the purvapakshin opposes
us on the ground of Sm/ri/ti, we reply to him on the ground of Sm/ri/ti
only; hence the line of defence taken up in the Sutra. Now it has been
shown already that the /S/ruti-texts aim at conveying the doctrine that
the Lord is the universal cause, and as wherever different Sm/ri/tis
conflict those maintaining one view must be accepted, while those which
maintain the opposite view must be set aside, those Sm/ri/tis which
follow /S/ruti are to be considered as authoritative, while all others
are to be disregarded; according to the Sutra met with in the chapter
treating of the means of proof (Mim. Sutra I, 3, 3), 'Where there is
contradiction (between /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti) (Sm/ri/ti) is to be
disregarded; in case of there being no (contradiction) (Sm/ri/ti is to
be recognised) as there is inference (of Sm/ri/ti being founded on
/S/ruti).'--Nor can we assume that some persons are able to perceive
supersensuous matters without /S/ruti, as there exists no efficient
cause for such perception. Nor, again, can it be said that such
perception may be assumed in the case of Kapila and others who possessed
supernatural powers, and consequently unobstructed power of cognition.
For the possession of supernatural powers itself depends on the
performance