said, that
'When he has departed there is no more knowledge.'

The third argument also of the purvapakshin, viz. that the word
'knower'--which occurs in the concluding passage, 'How should he know
the knower?'--denotes an agent, and therefore refers to the individual
soul as the object of sight, is to be refuted according to the view of
Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna.--Moreover, the text after having enumerated--in the
passage, 'For where there is duality as it were, there one sees the
other,' &c.--all the kinds of specific cognition which belong to the
sphere of Nescience declares--in the subsequent passage, 'But when the
Self only is all this, how should he see another?'--that in the sphere
of true knowledge all specific cognition such as seeing, and so on, is
absent. And, again, in order to obviate the doubt whether in the absence
of objects the knower might not know himself, Yaj/n/avalkya goes on,
'How, O beloved, should he know himself, the knower?' As thus the latter
passage evidently aims at proving the absence of specific cognition, we
have to conclude that the word 'knower' is here used to denote that
being which is knowledge, i.e. the Self.--That the view of
Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna is scriptural, we have already shown above. And as it is
so, all the adherents of the Vedanta must admit that the difference of
the soul and the highest Self is not real, but due to the limiting
adjuncts, viz. the body, and so on, which are the product of name and
form as presented by Nescience. That view receives ample confirmation
from Scripture; compare, for instance, 'Being only, my dear, this was in
the beginning, one, without a second' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1); 'The Self is
all this' (Ch. Up. VII, 25, 2); 'Brahman alone is all this' (Mu. Up. II,
2, 11); 'This everything is that Self' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 6); 'There is
no other seer but he' (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23); 'There is nothing that
sees but it' (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 11).--It is likewise confirmed by
Sm/ri/ti; compare, for instance, 'Vasudeva is all this' (Bha. Gi. VII,
19); 'Know me, O Bharata, to be the soul in all bodies' (Bha. Gi. XIII,
2); 'He who sees the highest Lord abiding alike within all creatures'
(Bha. Gi. XIII, 27).--The same conclusion is supported by those passages
which deny all difference; compare, for instance, 'If he thinks, that is
one and I another; he does not know' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10); 'From death
to death he goes who sees here any diversity' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 19).
And, again, b