nother passage also (Pr. Up. VI, 3) it is said of the
person of sixteen parts, 'He thought, &c. He sent forth Pra/n/a.' By
'seeing' (i.e. the verb 'seeing' exhibited in the Sutra) is not meant
that particular verb only, but any verbs which have a cognate sense;
just as the verb 'to sacrifice' is used to denote any kind of offering.
Therefore other passages also whose purport it is to intimate that an
all-knowing Lord is the cause of the world are to be quoted here, as,
for instance, Mu. Up. I, 1, 9, 'From him who perceives all and who knows
all, whose brooding consists of knowledge, from him is born that
Brahman, name and form and food.'

The argumentation of the Sa@nkhyas that the pradhana may be called
all-knowing on account of knowledge constituting an attribute of the
gu/n/a Goodness is inadmissible. For as in the pradhana-condition the
three gu/n/as are in a state of equipoise, knowledge which is a quality
of Goodness only is not possible[91]. Nor can we admit the explanation
that the pradhana is all-knowing because endowed with the capacity for
all knowledge. For if, in the condition of equipoise of the gu/n/as, we
term the pradhana all-knowing with reference to the power of knowledge
residing in Goodness, we must likewise term it little-knowing, with
reference to the power impeding knowledge which resides in Passion and
Darkness.

Moreover a modification of Goodness which is not connected with a
witnessing (observing) principle (sakshin) is not called knowledge, and
the non-intelligent pradhana is destitute of such a principle. It is
therefore impossible to ascribe to the pradhana all-knowingness. The
case of the Yogins finally does not apply to the point under
consideration; for as they possess intelligence, they may, owing to an
excess of Goodness in their nature, rise to omniscience[92].--Well then
(say those Sa@nkhyas who believe in the existence of a Lord) let us
assume that the pradhana possesses the quality of knowledge owing to the
witnessing principle (the Lord), just as the quality of burning is
imparted to an iron ball by fire.--No, we reply; for if this were so, it
would be more reasonable to assume that that which is the cause of the
pradhana having the quality of thought i.e. the all-knowing primary
Brahman itself is the cause of the world.

The objection that to Brahman also all-knowingness in its primary sense
cannot be ascribed because, if the activity of cognition were permanent,
Brahman coul