sume an
all-knowing Brahman can ascribe to it all-knowingness in so far only as
that term means capacity for all knowledge. For Brahman cannot always be
actually engaged in the cognition of everything; for from this there
would follow the absolute permanency of his cognition, and this would
involve a want of independence on Brahman's part with regard to the
activity of knowing. And if you should propose to consider Brahman's
cognition as non-permanent it would follow that with the cessation of
the cognition Brahman itself would cease. Therefore all-knowingness is
possible only in the sense of capacity for all knowledge. Moreover you
assume that previously to the origination of the world Brahman is
without any instruments of action. But without the body, the senses, &c.
which are the instruments of knowledge, cognition cannot take place in
any being. And further it must be noted that the pradhana, as consisting
of various elements, is capable of undergoing modifications, and may
therefore act as a (material) cause like clay and other substances;
while the uncompounded homogeneous Brahman is unable to do so.

To these conclusions he (Vyasa) replies in the following Sutra.

5. On account of seeing (i.e. thinking being attributed in the
Upanishads to the cause of the world; the pradhana) is not (to be
identified with the cause indicated by the Upanishads; for) it is not
founded on Scripture.

It is impossible to find room in the Vedanta-texts for the
non-intelligent pradhana, the fiction of the Sa@nkhyas; because it is
not founded on Scripture. How so? Because the quality of seeing, i.e.
thinking, is in Scripture ascribed to the cause. For the passage, Ch.
Up. VI, 2, (which begins: 'Being only, my dear, this was in the
beginning, one only, without a second,' and goes on, 'It thought (saw),
may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire,') declares that
this world differentiated by name and form, which is there denoted by
the word 'this,' was before its origination identical with the Self of
that which is and that the principle denoted by the term 'the being' (or
'that which is') sent forth fire and the other elements after having
thought. The following passage also ('Verily in the beginning all this
was Self, one only; there was nothing else blinking whatsoever. He
thought, shall I send forth worlds? He sent forth these worlds,' Ait.
Ar. II, 4, 1, 2) declares the creation to have had thought for its
antecedent. In a