e organs, internal
organs, and the objects of the senses, i.e. the external material
world.]

[Footnote 33: The object is said to have for its sphere the notion of
the 'thou' (yushmat), not the notion of the 'this' or 'that' (idam), in
order better to mark its absolute opposition to the subject or Ego.
Language allows of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and
the third person ('It is I,' 'I am he who,' &c.; ete vayam, ame vayam
asmahe), but not of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and
second person.]

[Footnote 34: Adhyasa, literally 'superimposition' in the sense of
(mistaken) ascription or imputation, to something, of an essential
nature or attributes not belonging to it. See later on.]

[Footnote 35: Natural, i.e. original, beginningless; for the modes of
speech and action which characterise transmigratory existence have
existed, with the latter, from all eternity.]

[Footnote 36: I.e. the intelligent Self which is the only reality and
the non-real objects, viz. body and so on, which are the product of
wrong knowledge.]

[Footnote 37: 'The body, &c. is my Self;' 'sickness, death, children,
wealth, &c., belong to my Self.']

[Footnote 38: Literally 'in some other place.' The clause 'in the form
of remembrance' is added, the Bhamati remarks, in order to exclude those
cases where something previously observed is recognised in some other
thing or place; as when, for instance, the generic character of a cow
which was previously observed in a black cow again presents itself to
consciousness in a grey cow, or when Devadatta whom we first saw in
Pa/t/aliputra again appears before us in Mahishmati. These are cases of
recognition where the object previously observed again presents itself
to our senses; while in mere remembrance the object previously perceived
is not in renewed contact with the senses. Mere remembrance operates in
the case of adhyasa, as when we mistake mother-of-pearl for silver which
is at the time not present but remembered only.]

[Footnote 39: The so-called anyathakhyativadins maintain that in the act
of adhyasa the attributes of one thing, silver for instance, are
superimposed on a different thing existing in a different place,
mother-of-pearl for instance (if we take for our example of adhyasa the
case of some man mistaking a piece of mother-of-pearl before him for a
piece of silver). The atmakhyativadins maintain that in adhyasa the
modification, in the form of silver,