e internal organ
and the individual soul.' Nor does the mantra under discussion fall
under the purvapaksha propounded above. For it does not aim at setting
forth the embodied individual soul, in so far as it is characterised by
the attributes connected with the transmigratory state, such as acting
and enjoying; but in so far rather as it transcends all attributes
connected with the sa/m/sara and is of the nature of Brahman, i.e. is
pure intelligence; as is evident from the clause, 'The other looks on
without eating.' That agrees, moreover, with /s/ruti and sm/ri/ti
passages, such as, 'That art thou,' and 'Know me also to be the
individual soul' (Bha. Gita XIII, 2). Only on such an explanation of the
passage as the preceding one there is room for the declaration made in
the concluding passage of the section, 'These two are the sattva and the
kshetraj/n/a; to him indeed who knows this no impurity
attaches[142].'--But how can, on the above interpretation, the
non-intelligent sattva (i.e. the internal organ) be spoken of as an
enjoyer, as is actually done in the clause, 'One of them eats the sweet
fruit?'--The whole passage, we reply, does not aim at setting forth the
fact that the sattva is an enjoyer, but rather the fact that the
intelligent individual soul is not an enjoyer, but is of the nature of
Brahman. To that end[143] the passage under discussion metaphorically
ascribes the attribute of being an enjoyer to the internal organ, in so
far as it is modified by pleasure, pain, and the like. For all acting
and enjoying is at the bottom based on the non-discrimination (by the
soul) of the respective nature of internal organ and soul: while in
reality neither the internal organ nor the soul either act or enjoy; not
the former, because it is non-intelligent; not the latter, because it is
not capable of any modification. And the internal organ can be
considered as acting and enjoying, all the less as it is a mere
presentment of Nescience. In agreement with what we have here
maintained, Scripture ('For where there is as it were duality there one
sees the other,' &c.; B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 15) declares that the practical
assumption of agents, and so on--comparable to the assumption of the
existence of elephants, and the like, seen in a dream--holds good in the
sphere of Nescience only; while the passage, 'But when the Self only is
all this, how should he see another?' declares that all that practically
postulated existence vanishes