has been shown a special reason in favour of Brahman (being
the abode), there is no such special reason in favour of anything else.
Hence he (the sutrakara) says that that which is inferred, i.e. the
pradhana assumed by the Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, is not to be accepted as the
abode of heaven, earth, &c.--Why?--On account of the terms not denoting
it. For the sacred text does not contain any term intimating the
non-intelligent pradhana, on the ground of which we might understand the
latter to be the general cause or abode; while such terms as 'he who
perceives all and knows all' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9) intimate an intelligent
being opposed to the pradhana in nature.--For the same reason the air
also cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth, and so on.

4. (Nor) also the individual soul (pra/n/abh/ri/t).

Although to the cognitional (individual) Self the qualities of Selfhood
and intelligence do belong, still omniscience and similar qualities do
not belong to it as its knowledge is limited by its adjuncts; thus the
individual soul also cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth,
&c., for the same reason, i.e. on account of the terms not denoting
it.--Moreover, the attribute of forming the abode of heaven, earth, and
so on, cannot properly be given to the individual soul because the
latter is limited by certain adjuncts and therefore non-pervading (not
omnipresent)[168].--The special enunciation (of the individual soul) is
caused by what follows[169].--The individual soul is not to be accepted
as the abode of heaven, earth, &c. for the following reason also.

5. On account of the declaration of difference.

The passage 'Know him alone as the Self' moreover implies a declaration
of difference, viz. of the difference of the object of knowledge and the
knower. Here the individual soul as being that which is desirous of
release is the knower, and consequently Brahman, which is denoted by the
word 'self' and represented as the object of knowledge, is understood to
be the abode of heaven, earth, and so on.--For the following reason also
the individual soul cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth,
&c.

6. On account of the subject-matter.

The highest Self constitutes the subject-matter (of the entire chapter),
as we see from the passage, 'Sir, what is that through which, when it is
known, everything else becomes known?' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 3) in which the
knowledge of everything is declared to be dependent on the kno