gs must be
admitted to reside, for that appears from such scriptural passages as
'the earth spoke,' 'the waters spoke,' &c. The non-intelligence of light
and the like, in so far as they are mere material elements, is admitted
in the case of the sun (aditya), &c. also; but--as already
remarked--from the use of the words in mantras and arthavadas it appears
that there are intelligent beings of divine nature (which animate those
material elements).

We now turn to the objection (raised above by the purvapakshin) that
mantras and arthavadas, as merely subserving other purposes, have no
power of setting forth the personality of the devas, and remark that not
the circumstance of subordination or non-subordination to some other
purpose, but rather the presence or absence of a certain idea furnishes
a reason for (our assuming) the existence of something. This is
exemplified by the case of a person who, having set out for some other
purpose, (nevertheless) forms the conviction of the existence of leaves,
grass, and the like, which he sees lying on the road.--But, the
purvapakshin may here object, the instance quoted by you is not strictly
analogous. In the case of the wanderer, perception, whose objects the
grass and leaves are, is active, and through it he forms the conception
of their existence. In the case of an arthavada, on the other hand,
which, as forming a syntactical unity with the corresponding injunctory
passage, merely subserves the purpose of glorifying (the latter), it is
impossible to determine any energy having a special object of its own.
For in general any minor syntactical unity, which is included in a more
comprehensive syntactical unity conveying a certain meaning, does not
possess the power of expressing a separate meaning of its own. Thus, for
instance, we derive, from the combination of the three words
constituting the negative sentence, '(Do) not drink wine,' one meaning
only, i.e. a prohibition of drinking wine, and do not derive an
additional meaning, viz. an order to drink wine, from the combination of
the last two words, 'drink wine.'--To this objection we reply, that the
instance last quoted is not analogous (to the matter under discussion).
The words of the sentence prohibiting the drinking of wine form only one
whole, and on that account the separate sense which any minor
syntactical unity included in the bigger sentence may possess cannot be
accepted. In the case of injunction and arthavada, on t