ficer are
invoked.--The second reason excludes those men whose only desire is
emancipation and who therefore do not care for the perishable fruits of
sacrifices.--The third and fourth reasons exclude the /S/udras who are
indirectly disqualified for /s/astric works because the Veda in
different places gives rules for the three higher castes only, and for
whom the ceremony of the upanayana--indispensable for all who wish to
study the Veda--is not prescribed.--Cp. Purva Mima/m/sa Sutras VI, 1.]

[Footnote 194: The reference is to Purva Mima/m/sa Sutras I, 1, 5 (not
to I, 2, 21, as stated in Muir's Sanskrit Texts, III, p. 69).]

[Footnote 195: In which classes of beings all the gods are comprised.]

[Footnote 196: Which shows that together with the non-eternality of the
thing denoted there goes the non-eternality of the denoting word.]

[Footnote 197: Ak/ri/ti, best translated by [Greek: eidos].]

[Footnote 198: The purvapakshin, i.e. here the grammarian maintains, for
the reasons specified further on, that there exists in the case of words
a supersensuous entity called spho/t/a which is manifested by the
letters of the word, and, if apprehended by the mind, itself manifests
the sense of the word. The term spho/t/a may, according as it is viewed
in either of these lights, be explained as the manifestor or that which
is manifested.--The spho/t/a is a grammatical fiction, the word in so
far as it is apprehended by us as a whole. That we cannot identify it
with the 'notion' (as Deussen seems inclined to do, p. 80) follows from
its being distinctly called va/k/aka or abhidhayaka, and its being
represented as that which causes the conception of the sense of a word
(arthadhihetu).]

[Footnote 199: For that each letter by itself expresses the sense is not
observed; and if it did so, the other letters of the word would have to
be declared useless.]

[Footnote 200: In order to enable us to apprehend the sense from the
word, there is required the actual consciousness of the last letter plus
the impressions of the preceding letters; just as smoke enables us to
infer the existence of fire only if we are actually conscious of the
smoke. But that actual consciousness does not take place because the
impressions are not objects of perceptive consciousness.]

[Footnote 201: 'How should it be so?' i.e. it cannot be so; and on that
account the differences apprehended do not belong to the letters
themselves, but to the external conditi