he other hand,
the words constituting the arthavada form a separate group of their own
which refers to some accomplished thing[214], and only subsequently to
that, when it comes to be considered what purpose they subserve, they
enter on the function of glorifying the injunction. Let us examine, as
an illustrative example, the injunctive passage, 'He who is desirous of
prosperity is to offer to Vayu a white animal.' All the words contained
in this passage are directly connected with the injunction. This is,
however, not the case with the words constituting the corresponding
arthavada passage, 'For Vayu is the swiftest deity; Vayu he approaches
with his own share; he leads him to prosperity.' The single words of
this arthavada are not grammatically connected with the single words of
the injunction, but form a subordinate unity of their own, which
contains the praise of Vayu, and glorify the injunction, only in so far
as they give us to understand that the action enjoined is connected with
a distinguished divinity. If the matter conveyed by the subordinate
(arthavada) passage can be known by some other means of knowledge, the
arthavada acts as a mere anuvada, i.e. a statement referring to
something (already known)[215]. When its contents are contradicted by
other means of knowledge it acts as a so-called gu/n/avada, i.e. a
statement of a quality[216]. Where, again, neither of the two mentioned
conditions is found, a doubt may arise whether the arthavada is to be
taken as a gu/n/avada on account of the absence of other means of
knowledge, or as an arthavada referring to something known (i.e. an
anuvada) on account of the absence of contradiction by other means of
proof. The latter alternative is, however, to be embraced by reflecting
people.--The same reasoning applies to mantras also.

There is a further reason for assuming the personality of the gods. The
Vedic injunctions, as enjoining sacrificial offerings to Indra and the
other gods, presuppose certain characteristic shapes of the individual
divinities, because without such the sacrificer could not represent
Indra and the other gods to his mind. And if the divinity were not
represented to the mind it would not be possible to make an offering to
it. So Scripture also says, 'Of that divinity for which the offering is
taken he is to think when about to say vausha/t/' (Ai. Br. III, 8, 1).
Nor is it possible to consider the essential form (or character) of a
thing to consis