evil is not stained by any imperfections, so the station of the
eye also is declared to be free from all stain, as we see from the
passage, 'Even though they drop melted butter or water on it it runs
away on both sides.' The statement, moreover, that he possesses the
qualities of sa/m/yadvama, &c. can be reconciled with the highest Lord
only (Ch. Up. IV, 15, 2, 'They call him Sa/m/yadvama, for all blessings
(vama) go towards him (sa/m/yanti). He is also vamani, for he leads
(nayati) all blessings (vama). He is also Bhamani, for he shines (bhati)
in all worlds'). Therefore, on account of agreement, the person within
the eye is the highest Lord.

14. And on account of the statement of place, and so on.

But how does the confined locality of the eye agree with Brahman which
is omnipresent like the ether?--To this question we reply that there
would indeed be a want of agreement if that one locality only were
assigned to the Lord. For other localities also, viz. the earth and so
on, are attributed to him in the passage, 'He who dwells in the earth,'
&c. (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 3). And among those the eye also is mentioned,
viz. in the clause, 'He who dwells in the eye,' &c. The phrase 'and so
on,' which forms part of the Sutra, intimates that not only locality is
assigned to Brahman, although not (really) appropriate to it, but that
also such things as name and form, although not appropriate to Brahman
which is devoid of name and form, are yet seen to be attributed to it.
That, in such passages as 'His name is ut, he with the golden beard'
(Ch. Up. I, 6, 7, 6), Brahman although devoid of qualities is spoken of,
for the purposes of devotion, as possessing qualities depending on name
and form, we have already shown. And we have, moreover, shown that to
attribute to Brahman a definite locality, in spite of his omnipresence,
subserves the purposes of contemplation, and is therefore not contrary
to reason[145]; no more than to contemplate Vish/n/u in the sacred
/s/alagram.

15. And on account of the passage referring to that which is
distinguished by pleasure (i.e. Brahman).

There is, moreover, really no room for dispute whether Brahman be meant
in the passage under discussion or not, because the fact of Brahman
being meant is established 'by the reference to that which is
distinguished by pleasure.' For the same Brahman which is spoken of as
characterised by pleasure in the beginning of the chapter[146], viz. in
the clauses, '