l preclude all
causes of a nature opposite to that of Brahman.

12. (The Self) consisting of bliss (is the highest Self) on account of
the repetition (of the word 'bliss,' as denoting the highest Self).

The Taittiriya-upanishad (II, 1-5), after having enumerated the Self
consisting of food, the Self consisting of the vital airs, the Self
consisting of mind, and the Self consisting of understanding, says,
'Different from this which consists of understanding is the other inner
Self which consists of bliss.' Here the doubt arises whether the phrase,
'that which consists of bliss,' denotes the highest Brahman of which it
had been said previously, that 'It is true Being, Knowledge, without
end,' or something different from Brahman, just as the Self consisting
of food, &c., is different from it.--The purvapakshin maintains that the
Self consisting of bliss is a secondary (not the principal) Self, and
something different from Brahman; as it forms a link in a series of
Selfs, beginning with the Self consisting of food, which all are not the
principal Self. To the objection that even thus the Self consisting of
bliss may be considered as the primary Self, since it is stated to be
the innermost of all, he replies that this cannot be admitted, because
the Self of bliss is declared to have joy and so on for its limbs, and
because it is said to be embodied. If it were identical with the primary
Self, joy and the like would not touch it; but the text expressly says
'Joy is its head;' and about its being embodied we read, 'Of that former
one this one is the embodied Self' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), i.e. of that
former Self of Understanding this Self of bliss is the embodied Self.
And of what is embodied, the contact with joy and pain cannot be
prevented. Therefore the Self which consists of bliss is nothing but the
transmigrating Soul.

To this reasoning we make the following reply:--By the Self consisting
of bliss we have to understand the highest Self, 'on account of
repetition.' For the word 'bliss' is repeatedly applied to the highest
Self. So Taitt. Up. II, 7, where, after the clause 'That is
flavour'--which refers back to the Self consisting of bliss, and
declares it to be of the nature of flavour--we read, 'For only after
having perceived flavour can any one perceive delight. Who could
breathe, who could breathe forth if that Bliss existed not in the ether
(of the heart)? For he alone causes blessedness;' and again, II, 8, 'Now
th