d not be considered as independent with regard to it, we
refute as follows. In what way, we ask the Sa@nkhya, is Brahman's
all-knowingness interfered with by a permanent cognitional activity? To
maintain that he, who possesses eternal knowledge capable to throw light
on all objects, is not all-knowing, is contradictory. If his knowledge
were considered non-permanent, he would know sometimes, and sometimes he
would not know; from which it would follow indeed that he is not
all-knowing. This fault is however avoided if we admit Brahman's
knowledge to be permanent.--But, it may be objected, on this latter
alternative the knower cannot be designated as independent with
reference to the act of knowing.--Why not? we reply; the sun also,
although his heat and light are permanent, is nevertheless designated as
independent when we say, 'he burns, he gives light[93].'--But, it will
again be objected, we say that the sun burns or gives light when he
stands in relation to some object to be heated or illuminated; Brahman,
on the other hand, stands, before the creation of the world, in no
relation to any object of knowledge. The cases are therefore not
parallel.--This objection too, we reply, is not valid; for as a matter
of fact we speak of the Sun as an agent, saying 'the sun shines' even
without reference to any object illuminated by him, and hence Brahman
also may be spoken of as an agent, in such passages as 'it thought,'
&c., even without reference to any object of knowledge. If, however, an
object is supposed to be required ('knowing' being a transitive verb
while 'shining' is intransitive), the texts ascribing thought to Brahman
will fit all the better.--What then is that object to which the
knowledge of the Lord can refer previously to the origin of the
world?--Name and form, we reply, which can be defined neither as being
identical with Brahman nor as different from it, unevolved but about to
be evolved. For if, as the adherents of the Yoga-/s/astra assume, the
Yogins have a perceptive knowledge of the past and the future through
the favour of the Lord; in what terms shall we have to speak of the
eternal cognition of the ever pure Lord himself, whose objects are the
creation, subsistence, and dissolution of the world! The objection that
Brahman, previously to the origin of the world, is not able to think
because it is not connected with a body, &c. does not apply; for
Brahman, whose nature is eternal cognition--as the sun's n