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in the execution of the laws is an incident of that power; that the Secretary of the Treasury was such an officer; that the custody of the public property and money was an executive function exercised through the Secretary of the Treasury and his subordinates: that in the performance of these duties the Secretary was subject to the supervision and control of the President: and finally that the act establishing the Bank of the United States "did not, as it could not change the relation between the President and Secretary--did not release the former from his obligation to see the law faithfully executed nor the latter from the President's supervision and control."[390] In short, the President's removal power, in this case unqualified, was the sanction provided by the Constitution for his power and duty to control his "subordinates" in all their official actions of public consequence. CONGRESSIONAL POWER VERSUS PRESIDENTIAL DUTY TO THE LAW Five years later the case of Kendall _v._ United States[391] arose. The United States owed one Stokes money, and when Postmaster General Kendall, at Jackson's instigation, refused to pay it, Congress passed a special act ordering payment. Kendall, however, still proved noncompliant, whereupon Stokes sought and obtained a mandamus in the United States circuit court for the District of Columbia, and on appeal this decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court. While Kendall _v._ United States, like Marbury _v._ Madison, involved the question of the responsibility of a head of department for the performance of a _ministerial_ duty, the discussion by counsel before the Court and the Court's own opinion covered the entire subject of the relation of the President to his subordinates in the performance by them of statutory duties. The lower court had asserted that the duty of the President under the faithful execution clause gave him no other control over the officer than to see that he acts honestly, with proper motives, but no power to construe the law, and see that the executive action conforms to it. Counsel for Kendall attacked this position vigorously, relying largely upon statements by Hamilton, Marshall, James Wilson, and Story having to do with the President's power in the field of foreign relations. The Court rejected the implication with emphasis. There are, it pointed out, "certain political duties imposed upon many officers in the executive department, the discharge of which is un
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