goods, whose constant possession is
established by the laws of society; that is, by the laws of justice.
Those, therefore, who make use of the words property, or right, or
obligation, before they have explained the origin of justice, or
even make use of them in that explication, are guilty of a very gross
fallacy, and can never reason upon any solid foundation. A man's
property is some object related to him. This relation is not natural,
but moral, and founded on justice. It is very preposterous, therefore,
to imagine, that we can have any idea of property, without fully
comprehending the nature of justice, and shewing its origin in the
artifice and contrivance of man. The origin of justice explains that of
property. The same artifice gives rise to both. As our first and most
natural sentiment of morals is founded on the nature of our passions,
and gives the preference to ourselves and friends, above strangers; it
is impossible there can be naturally any such thing as a fixed right
or property, while the opposite passions of men impel them in contrary
directions, and are not restrained by any convention or agreement.
No one can doubt, that the convention for the distinction of property,
and for the stability of possession, is of all circumstances the most
necessary to the establishment of human society, and that after the
agreement for the fixing and observing of this rule, there remains
little or nothing to be done towards settling a perfect harmony and
concord. All the other passions, besides this of interest, are either
easily restrained, or are not of such pernicious consequence, when
indulged. Vanity is rather to be esteemed a social passion, and a bond
of union among men. Pity and love are to be considered in the same
light. And as to envy and revenge, though pernicious, they operate
only by intervals, and are directed against particular persons, whom we
consider as our superiors or enemies. This avidity alone, of acquiring
goods and possessions for ourselves and our nearest friends, is
insatiable, perpetual, universal, and directly destructive of society.
There scarce is any one, who is not actuated by it; and there is no one,
who has not reason to fear from it, when it acts without any restraint,
and gives way to its first and most natural movements. So that upon
the whole, we are to esteem the difficulties in the establishment of
society, to be greater or less, according to those we encounter in
regulating and
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