account of his enterprising spirit, the more important adversary; in
him, therefore, lay the centre of attraction which drew the others along
in the same direction.
3. Because the losses which Bluecher had sustained almost amounted to a
defeat, which gave Buonaparte such a preponderance over him as to
make his retreat to the Rhine almost certain, and at the same time no
reserves of any consequence awaited him there.
4. Because there was no other result which would be so terrific in its
aspects, would appear to the imagination in such gigantic proportions,
an immense advantage in dealing with a Staff so weak and irresolute as
that of Schwartzenberg notoriously was at this time. What had
happened to the Crown Prince of Wartemberg at Montereau, and to Count
Wittgenstein at Mormant, Prince Schwartzenberg must have known well
enough; but all the untoward events on Bluecher's distant and separate
line from the Marne to the Rhine would only reach him by the avalanche
of rumour. The desperate movements which Buonaparte made upon Vitry at
the end of March, to see what the Allies would do if he threatened to
turn them strategically, were evidently done on the principle of working
on their fears; but it was done under far different circumstances, in
consequence of his defeat at Laon and Arcis, and because Bluecher, with
100,000 men, was then in communication with Schwartzenberg.
There are people, no doubt, who will not be convinced on these
arguments, but at all events they cannot retort by saying, that "whilst
Buonaparte threatened Schwartzenberg's base by advancing to the Rhine,
Schwartzenberg at the same time threatened Buonaparte's communications
with Paris," because we have shown by the reasons above given that
Schwartzenberg would never have thought of marching on Paris.
With respect to the example quoted by us from the campaign of 1796, we
should say: Buonaparte looked upon the plan he adopted as the surest
means of beating the Austrians; but admitting that it was so, still the
object to be attained was only an empty victory, which could have hardly
any sensible influence on the fall of Mantua. The way which we should
have chosen would, in our opinion, have been much more certain to
prevent the relief of Mantua; but even if we place ourselves in the
position of the French General and assume that it was not so, and look
upon the certainty of success to have been less, the question then
amounts to a choice between a mo
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