had tried another blow at Bluecher, and pursued him
to the Rhine? We are convinced that it would have completely changed
the course of the campaign, and that the Army of the Allies, instead of
marching to Paris, would have retired behind the Rhine. We do not ask
others to share our conviction, but no one who understands the thing
will doubt, at the mere mention of this alternative course, that it is
one which should not be overlooked in criticism.

(*) Compare Hinterlassene Werks, 2nd edition. vol. vii. p.
193 et seq.

In this case the means of comparison lie much more on the surface
than in the foregoing, but they have been equally overlooked, because
one-sided views have prevailed, and there has been no freedom of
judgment.

From the necessity of pointing out a better means which might have
been used in place of those which are condemned has arisen the form of
criticism almost exclusively in use, which contents itself with pointing
out the better means without demonstrating in what the superiority
consists. The consequence is that some are not convinced, that others
start up and do the same thing, and that thus discussion arises which
is without any fixed basis for the argument. Military literature abounds
with matter of this sort.

The demonstration we require is always necessary when the superiority
of the means propounded is not so evident as to leave no room for doubt,
and it consists in the examination of each of the means on its own
merits, and then of its comparison with the object desired. When once
the thing is traced back to a simple truth, controversy must cease, or
at all events a new result is obtained, whilst by the other plan the
pros and cons go on for ever consuming each other.

Should we, for example, not rest content with assertion in the case
before mentioned, and wish to prove that the persistent pursuit
of Bluecher would have been more advantageous than the turning on
Schwartzenberg, we should support the arguments on the following simple
truths:

1. In general it is more advantageous to continue our blows in one
and the same direction, because there is a loss of time in striking in
different directions; and at a point where the moral power is already
shaken by considerable losses there is the more reason to expect fresh
successes, therefore in that way no part of the preponderance already
gained is left idle.

2. Because Bluecher, although weaker than Schwartzenberg, was, on