herefore, follow that system which I learnt from Antiochus; and I find
no reason why I should judge "If it does shine, it does shine" to be true,
because I have learnt that everything which is connected with itself is
true; and yet not judge "If you lie, you lie," to be connected with itself
in the same manner. Either, therefore, I must judge both this and that to
be true, or, if I may not judge this to be true, then I cannot judge that
to be.

XXXI. However, to pass over all those prickles, and all that tortuous kind
of discussion, and to show what we are:--after having explained the whole
theory of Carneades, all the quibbles of Antiochus will necessarily fall
to pieces. Nor will I say anything in such a way as to lead any one to
suspect that anything is invented by me. I will take what I say from
Clitomachus, who was with Carneades till his old age, a man of great
shrewdness, (indeed, he was a Carthaginian,) and very studious and
diligent. And he has written four books on the subject of withholding
assent; but what I am going to say is taken out of the first.

Carneades asserts that there are two kinds of appearances; and that the
first kind may be divided into those which can be perceived and those
which cannot; and the other into those which are probable and those which
are not. Therefore, those which are pronounced to be contrary to the
senses and contrary to evidentness belong to the former division; but that
nothing can be objected to those of the second kind. Wherefore his opinion
is, that there is no appearance of such a character that perception will
follow it, but many such as to draw after them probability. Indeed, it
would be contrary to nature if nothing were probable; and that entire
overturning of life, which you were speaking of, Lucullus, would ensue.
Therefore there are many things which may be proved by the senses; only
one must recollect that there is not in them anything of such a character
that there may not also be something which is false, but which in no
respect differs from it in appearance; and so, whatever happens which is
probable in appearance, if nothing offers itself which is contrary to that
probability, the wise man will use it; and in this way the whole course of
life will be regulated.

And, in truth, that wise man whom you are bringing on the stage, is often
guided by what is probable, not being comprehended, nor perceived, nor
assented to, but only likely; and unless a man acts o