relaxed, but is indivisible. But the accidental form is its own
power. Much more therefore is that substantial form which is the soul.
Obj. 4: Further, we sense by the sensitive power and we understand by
the intellectual power. But "that by which we first sense and
understand" is the soul, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii,
2). Therefore the soul is its own power.
Obj. 5: Further, whatever does not belong to the essence is an
accident. Therefore if the power of the soul is something else
besides the essence thereof, it is an accident, which is contrary to
Augustine, who says that the foregoing (see Obj. 1) "are not in the
soul as in a subject as color or shape, or any other quality, or
quantity, are in a body; for whatever is so, does not exceed the
subject in which it is: Whereas the mind can love and know other
things" (De Trin. ix, 4).
Obj. 6: Further, "a simple form cannot be a subject." But the soul is
a simple form; since it is not composed of matter and form, as we
have said above (Q. 75, A. 5). Therefore the power of the soul cannot
be in it as in a subject.
Obj. 7: Further, an accident is not the principle of a substantial
difference. But sensitive and rational are substantial differences;
and they are taken from sense and reason, which are powers of the
soul. Therefore the powers of the soul are not accidents; and so it
would seem that the power of the soul is its own essence.
_On the contrary,_ Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xi) says that "heavenly
spirits are divided into essence, power, and operation." Much more,
then, in the soul is the essence distinct from the virtue or power.
_I answer that,_ It is impossible to admit that the power of the soul
is its essence, although some have maintained it. For the present
purpose this may be proved in two ways. First, because, since power
and act divide being and every kind of being, we must refer a power
and its act to the same genus. Therefore, if the act be not in the
genus of substance, the power directed to that act cannot be in the
genus of substance. Now the operation of the soul is not in the genus
of substance; for this belongs to God alone, whose operation is His
own substance. Wherefore the Divine power which is the principle of
His operation is the Divine Essence itself. This cannot be true
either of the soul, or of any creature; as we have said above when
speaking of the angels (Q. 54, A. 3). Secondly, this may be also
shown to be impossib
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