t her rapid
strides southward; and it is at least highly probable that she bought
off Germany by waiving her own claims to Kiao-chau, provided that she
gained an ideal terminus for her Siberian line, and a great naval and
military stronghold. It is also worth noting that the first German
troops were landed at Kiao-chau on November 17, 1897, while three
Russian warships steamed into Port Arthur on December 18; and that the
German "lease" was signed at Pekin on March 5, 1898; while that
accorded to Russia bears date March 27[493].

[Footnote 493: Asakawa, p. 110, note.]

If we accept the naive suggestion of the Russian author, "Vladimir," the
occupation of Kiao-chau by Germany "forced" Russia "to claim some
equivalent compensation." Or possibly the cession of Port Arthur was
another of the items in Li Hung Chang's bargain with Russia. In any
case, the Russian warships entered Port Arthur, at first as if for a
temporary stay; when two British warships repaired thither the Czar's
Government requested them to leave--a request with which the Salisbury
Cabinet complied in an inexplicably craven manner (January 1898). Rather
more pressure was needed on the somnolent mandarins of Pekin; but, under
the threat of war with Russia if the lease of the Liao-tung Peninsula
were not granted by March 27, it was signed on that day. She thereby
gained control of that peninsula for twenty-five years, a period which
might be extended "by mutual agreement." The control of all the land
forces was vested in a Russian official; and China undertook not to
quarter troops to the north without the consent of the Czar. Port Arthur
was reserved to the use of Russian and Chinese ships of war; and Russia
gained the right to erect fortifications.

The British Government, which had hitherto sought to uphold the
integrity of China, thereupon sought to "save its face" by leasing
Wei-hai-wei (July 1). An excuse for the weakness of the Cabinet in
Chinese affairs has been put forward, namely, that the issue of the
Sudan campaign was still in doubt, and that the efforts of French and
Russians to reach the Upper Nile from the French Congo and Southern
Abyssinia compelled Ministers to concentrate their attention on that
great enterprise. But this excuse will not bear examination. Strength at
any one point of an Empire is not increased by discreditable surrenders
at other points. No great statesman would have proceeded on such an
assumption.

Obviously the ba