ew because its
value, as seen beforehand, measured more than the value of the old, but
we now declare the old, seen in retrospect, to have been worth less (Sec.Sec.
8-12). There are apparently no valid objections to this view to be
drawn from the current logical type of marginal-utility analysis (Sec. 13).

II. Because so-called economic "choice" is in reality "constructive
comparison" it must be regarded as essentially ethical in import. Ethics
and economic theory, instead of dealing with separate problems of
conduct, deal with distinguishable but inseparable stages belonging to
the complete analysis of most, if not all, problems (Sec. 14). This view
suggests, (_a_) that no reasons in experience or in logic exist for
identifying the economic interest with an attitude of exclusive or
particularistic egoism (Sec. 15), and (_b_) that social reformers are
justified in their assumption of a certain "perfectibility" in human
nature--a constructive responsiveness instead of an insensate and
stubborn inertia (Sec. 16). Again, in the process of constructive
comparison in its economic phase, Price or Exchange Value is, in
apparent accord with the English classical tradition, the fundamental
working conception. Value as "absolute" is essentially a subordinate and
"conservative" conception, belonging to a status of system and routine,
and is "absolute" in a purely functional sense (Sec. 17). And finally
constructive comparison, with price or exchange value as its dominant
conception, is clearly nothing if not a market process. In the nature of
the case, then, there can be no such ante-market definiteness and
rigidity of demand schedules as a strictly marginal-utility theory of
market prices logically must require (Sec. 18).

Sec. 20. In at least two respects the argument falls short of what might be
desired. No account is given of the actual procedure of constructive
comparison and nothing like a complete survey of the leading ideas and
problems of economic theory is undertaken by way of verification. But to
have supplied the former in any satisfactory way would have required an
unduly extended discussion of the more general, or ethical, phases of
constructive comparison. The other deficiency is less regrettable, since
the task in question is one that could only be hopefully undertaken and
convincingly carried through by a professional economist.

For the present purpose, it is perhaps enough to have found in our
economic experi