not to say a universal group, operates to limit the
objectivity.

In the aesthetic and moral attitudes we incorporate value in the object
decisively. We do not like to think that beauty can be changed with
shifting fashions or to affirm that the firmament was ever anything but
sublime. It seems to belong to the very essence of right that it is
something to which the self can commit itself in absolute loyalty and
finality. And, as for good, we may say with Moore in judgments of
intrinsic value, at least, "we judge concerning a particular state of
things that it would be worth while--would be a good thing--that that
state of things should exist, even if nothing else were to exist
besides."

With regard to this problem of objectivity it is significant in the
first place that the kind of situation out of which this object value is
affirmed in aesthetic and moral judgments is a social situation. It
contrasts in this respect with the economic situation. The economic is
indeed social in so far as it sets exchange values, but the object
valued is not a social object. The aesthetic and moral object is such an
object. Not only is there no contradiction in giving to the symbolic
form or the moral act intrinsic value: there is entire plausibility in
doing so. For in so far as the situation is really personal, _either
member is fundamentally equal to the other and may be treated as
embodying all the value of the situation_. The value which rises to
consciousness in the situation is made more complete by eliminating from
consideration the originating factors, the plural agents of admiration
or approval, and incorporating the whole product abstractly in the
object. In thus calling attention to the social or personal character of
the aesthetic or moral object it is not intended to minimize that factor
in the judgment which we properly speak of as the universalizing
activity of thought, much less to overlook the importance of the
judgmental process itself. The intention is to point out some of the
reasons why in one case the thinking process does universalize while in
the other it does not, why in one case the judgment is completely
objective while in the other it is not. In both aesthetic and moral
judgments social art, social action, social judgments, through
collective decisions prepare the way for the general non-personal,
objective form. It is probable that man would not say, "This is right,"
using the word as an adjective, if he