r at least it is
arguable--that the condemnation had better results than an acquittal
would have yielded. But it would be contrary to our ordinary use of
language to maintain that this made the act right. Or to take a more
recent case: the present war may conceivably lead to a more permanent
peace. The "severities," practised by one party, may stir the other to
greater indignation and lead ultimately to triumph of the latter. Will
the acts in question be termed right by the second party if they
actually have this effect? On this hypothesis the more outrageous an act
and the greater the reaction against it, the better the consequences are
likely to be and hence the more reason to call the act right and a duty.
The paradox results from omitting from right the elements of the
immediate situation and considering only consequences. The very meaning
of the concept right, implies focussing attention upon the present
rather than upon the future. It suggests a cross-section of life in its
relations. If the time process were to be arrested immediately after our
act I think we might still speak of it as right or wrong. In trying to
judge a proposed act we doubtless try to discover what it will mean,
that is, we look at consequences. But these consequences are looked upon
as giving us the meaning of the present act and we do not on this
account subordinate the present act to these consequences. Especially we
do not mean to eliminate the significance of this very process of
judgment. It is significant that in considering what are the intrinsic
goods Moore enumerates personal affection and the appreciation of
beauty, and with less positiveness, true belief, but does not include
any mention of the valuing or choosing or creative consciousness.
(4) If we regard right as the concept which reflects the judgment of
standardizing our acts by some ideal order, questions arise as to the
objectivity of this order and the fixed or moving character of the
implied standard. Rashdall lays great stress upon the importance of
objectivity: "Assuredly there is no scientific problem upon which so
much depends as upon the answer we give to the question whether the
distinction which we are accustomed to draw between right and wrong
belongs to the region of objective truth like the laws of mathematics
and of physical science, or whether it is based upon an actual emotional
constitution of individual human beings."[73] The appraisement of the
various des
|