s the individual himself shows him also that he is living in a
world with other persons and other things whose mode of behavior and
whose interests determine for him the conditions through which his own
interests are to be realized."

What kind of "knowledge" is it "which shows the individual himself"?
Professor Fite has two quite different ways of referring to this. He
uses one set of terms when he would contrast his view with the
sentimental, or the "Oriental," or justify exploitation by those who
know better what they are about than the exploited. He uses another set
of terms to characterize it when he wishes to commend his view as human,
and fraternal, and as affording the only firm basis for social reform.
In the first case he speaks of "mere knowing"; of intelligence as
"clear," and "far-sighted," of higher degrees of consciousness as simply
"more in one." "Our test of intelligence would be breadth of vision (in
a coherent view), fineness and keenness of insight."[81]

In the second case it is "generous," it will show an "intelligent
sympathy"; it seeks "fellowship," and would not "elect to live in a
social environment in which the distinction of 'inferiors' were an
essential part of the idea."[82] The type of intelligence is found not
in the man seeking wealth or power, nor in the legal acumen which
forecasts all discoverable consequences and devises means to carry out
purposes, but in literature and art.[83]

The terms which cover both these meanings are the words "consider" and
"considerate." "Breadth of consideration" gives the basis for rights.
The selfish man is the "inconsiderate."[84] This term plays the part of
the _amor intellectualis_ in the system of Spinoza, which enables him at
once to discard all emotion and yet to keep it. For "consideration" is
used in common life, and defined in the dictionaries, as meaning both
"examination," "careful thought," and "appreciative or sympathetic
regard." The ambiguity in the term may well have served to disguise from
the author himself the double role which intelligence is made to play.
The broader use is the only one that does justice to the moral
consciousness, but we cannot include sympathy and still maintain that
"mere knowing" covers the whole. The insistence at times upon the "mere
knowing" is a mechanical element which needs to be removed before the
ethical implications can be accepted.

Once more, how does one know himself and others? Is it the same pro