s epistemological, instead of being a plea for taking the facts
of experience as we find them without refraction through epistemological
apparatus.
[7] It is interesting to note that some of the realists who have
assimilated the cognitive relation to other existential relations in the
world (instead of treating it as an unique or epistemological relation)
have been forced in support of their conception of knowledge as a
"presentative" or spectatorial affair to extend the defining features of
the latter to all relations among things, and hence to make all the
"real" things in the world pure "simples," wholly independent of one
another. So conceived the doctrine of external relations appears to be
rather the doctrine of complete externality of _things_. Aside from this
point, the doctrine is interesting for its dialectical ingenuity and for
the elegant development of assumed premises, rather than convincing on
account of empirical evidence supporting it.
[8] In other words, there is a general "problem of error" only because
there is a general problem of evil, concerning which see Dr. Kallen's
essay, below.
[9] Compare the paper by Professor Bode.
[10] As the attempt to retain the epistemological problem and yet to
reject idealistic and relativistic solutions has forced some
Neo-realists into the doctrine of isolated and independent simples, so
it has also led to a doctrine of Eleatic pluralism. In order to maintain
the doctrine the subject makes no difference to anything else, it is
held that _no_ ultimate real makes any difference to anything else--all
this rather than surrender once for all the genuineness of the problem
and to follow the lead of empirical subject-matter.
[11] There is almost no end to the various dialectic developments of the
epistemological situation. When it is held that all the relations of the
type in question are cognitive, and yet it is recognized (as it must be)
that many such "transformations" go unremarked, the theory is
supplemented by introducing "unconscious" psychical modifications.
[12] Conception-presentation has, of course, been made by many in the
history of speculation an exception to this statement; "pure" memory is
also made an exception by Bergson. To take cognizance of this matter
would, of course, accentuate, not relieve, the difficulty remarked upon
in the text.
[13] Cf. _Studies in Logical Theory_, Chs. I and II, by Dewey; also
"Epistemology and Mental States," T
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