y error is _ex post facto_
explicable as a function of the real conditions under which it really
arose. Hence, "consciousness," set over against Reality, was not its
condition.

[37] C. Judson Herrick, "Some Reflections on the Origin and Significance
of the Cerebral Cortex," _Journal of Animal Behavior_, Vol. III, pp.
228-233.

[38] _Psychology_, Vol. I, p. 256.

[39] H. C. Warren, _Psychological Review_, Vol. XXI, Page 93.

[40] _Principles of Psychology_, I, p. 241, note.

[41] _Ibid._, p. 258.

[42] _Psychology. Briefer Course._ P. 468.

[43] Angell, _Psychology_, p. 65.

[44] _Psychology_, Vol. I, p. 251.

[45] Thorstein Veblen: _The Instinct of Workmanship_, p. 316.

[46] It may still be argued that we must depend upon analogy in our
acceptance or rejection of a new commodity. For any element of novelty
must surely suggest something to us, must _mean_ something to us, if it
is to attract or repel. Thus, the motor-car will whirl us rapidly over
the country, the motor-boat will dart over the water without effort on
our part. And in such measure as we have had them hitherto, we have
always enjoyed experiences of rapid motion. These new instruments simply
promise a perfectly well-known _sort_ of experience in fuller measure.
So the argument may run. And our mental process in such a case may
accordingly be held to be nothing more mysterious than a passing by
analogy from the _old_ ways in which we got rapid motion in the past to
the _new_ way which now promises more of the same. And more of the same
is what we want.

"More of the same" means here intensive magnitude and in this connection
at all events it begs the question. Bergson's polemic seems perfectly
valid against such a use of the notion. But kept in logical terms the
case seems clearer. It is said that we reason in such a case by
"analogy." We do, indeed; but what is analogy? The term explains nothing
until the real process behind the term is clearly and realistically
conceived. What I shall here suggest holds true, I think, as an account
of analogical inference generally and not simply for the economic type
of case we have here to do with. Reasoning is too often thought of as
proceeding from given independent premises--as here (1) the fact that
hitherto the driving we have most enjoyed and the sailing we have most
enjoyed have been _fast_ and (2) the fact that the motor-car is _fast_.
But do we accept the conclusion because the premises suggest i