dequate"
apprehension of what things are good than he may already possess, just
as the objectivist theory of consciousness ( = knowledge) can supply no
clue as to how or whether a _more_ or a _less_ comprehensive or a
qualitatively _different_ "cross-section of entities" can or should be
got into one's "mind" as warrant or guidance ("stimulus") for a
contemplated response that is to meet a present emergency (cf. John
Dewey, "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," _Psychol. Rev._, Vol.
IV). Thus neither sort of deliverance out of the alleged predicament of
egocentricity abates in the least the only serious inconvenience or
danger threatened by subjectivism.
[58] Cf. W. Jethro Brown, _The Underlying Principles of Modern
Legislation_ (3d ed., London, 1914), pp. 165-68.
[59] Bosanquet: _Principle of Individuality and Value_, pp. 13, 15, 20,
24, 27, 30.
[60] The case against the Austrian explanation of market-price in terms
of marginal utility has been well summed up and re-enforced by B. M.
Anderson in his monograph, _Social Value_ (Boston, 1911). Anderson finds
the fatal flaw in the Austrian account to consist in the psychological
particularism of the marginal utility theory. The only way, he holds, to
provide an adequate foundation for a non-circular theory of price is to
understand the marginal estimates people put upon goods as resultants of
the entire moral, legal, institutional, scientific, aesthetical, and
religious state of society at the time. This total and therefore
absolute state of affairs, if I understand the argument, is to be
regarded as focussed to a unique point in the estimate each man puts
upon a commodity. Thus, presumably, the values which come together,
summed up in the total demand and supply schedules for a commodity in
the market, are "social values" and the resultant market-price is a
"social price." This cross-sectional social totality of conditions is
strongly suggestive of an idealistic Absolute. The individual is a mere
focussing of impersonal strains and stresses in the Absolute. But the
real society is a radically temporal process. The real centers of
initiation in it are creatively intelligent individuals whose economic
character as such expresses itself not in "absolute" marginal
registrations but in price estimates.
On the priority of price to value I venture to claim the support of A.
A. Young, "Some Limitations of the Value Concept," _Quart. Journ.
Econ._, Vol. XXV, p. 409 (esp
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