thet "appearance." To deny reality
to evil is to multiply the evil. It is to make two "problems" grow where
only one grew before, to add to the "problem of evil" the "problem of
appearance" without serving any end toward the solution of the real
problem how evil can be effectively abolished.
I may then, in view of these reflections, hold myself safe in assuming
that the world we live in was not made for us; that, humanly speaking,
it is open to improvement in a great many directions. It will be
comparatively innocuous to assume also, as a corollary, that in so far
as the world was made for mind, it has been made so by man, that
civilization is the adaptation of nature to human nature. And as a
second corollary it may be safely assumed that the world does not stay
made; civilization has brought its own problems and peculiar evils.
I realize that, in the light of my title, much of what I have written
above must seem irrelevant, since the "problem of evil" has not, within
the philosophic tradition, been considered part of a "problem of values"
as such. If I dwell on it, I do so to indicate that the "problem of
evil" can perhaps be best understood in the light of another problem:
the problem, namely, of why men have created the "problem of evil." For
obviously, evil can be problematic only in an absolutely good world, and
the idea that the world is absolutely good is not a generalization
_upon_ experience, but a contradiction _of_ experience. If there exists
a metaphysical "problem of evil," hence, it arises out of this
generalization; it is secondary, not primary; and the primary problem
requires solution before the secondary one can be understood. And what
else, under the circumstances, can the primary one be than this: "Why do
men contradict their own experience?"
II
So put, the problem suggests its own solution. It indicates, first of
all, that nature and human nature are not completely compatible, that
consequently, conclusions are being forced by nature on human nature
which human nature resents and rejects, and that traits are being
assigned to nature by human nature which nature does not possess, but
which, if possessed, would make her congenial to human needs. All this
is so platitudinous that I feel ashamed to write it; but then, how can
one avoid platitudes without avoiding truth? And truth here is the
obvious fact that since human nature is the point of existence to which
good and evil refer, what is c
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