cess may be further defined in certain
aspects by comparison with the view of Professor Fite, who likewise
develops the significance of consciousness and particularly of
intelligence for our ethical concepts and social program.
Professor Fite insists that in contrast with the "functional psychology"
which would make consciousness merely a means to the preservation of the
organic individual in mechanical working order, the whole value of life
from the standpoint of the conscious agent consists in its being
conscious. Creative moments in which there is complete conscious control
of materials and technique represent high and unique individuality.
Extension of range of consciousness makes the agent "a larger and more
inclusive being," for he is living in the future and past as well as in
the present. Consciousness means that a new and original force is
inserted into the economy of the social and the physical world."[78] On
the basis of the importance of consciousness Professor Fite would ground
his justification of rights, his conception of justice, and his social
program. The individual derives his rights simply from the fact that he
knows what he is doing, hence as individuals differ in intelligence they
differ in rights. The problem of justice is that of according to each a
degree of recognition proportioned to his intelligence, that is, treat
others as ends so far as they are intelligent; so far as they are
ignorant treat them as means.[79] "The conscious individual when dealing
with other conscious individuals will take account of their aims, as of
other factors in his situation. This will involve 'adjustment,' but not
abandonment of ends, i.e., self-sacrifice. Obligation to consider these
ends of others is based on 'the same logic that binds me to get out of
the way of an approaching train.'"[80]
The point in which the conception of rights and justice and the implied
social program advocated in this paper differs as I view it from that of
Professor Fite is briefly this. I regard both the individual and his
rights as essentially synthetic and in constant process of
reconstruction. Therefore what is due to any individual at a moment is
not measured by his present stage of consciousness. It is measured
rather by his possibilities than his actualities. This does not mean
that the actual is to be ignored, but it does mean that if we take our
stand upon the actual we are committed to a program with little place
for imagi
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