rmed act as a whole and in its relations. Especially
they mean considering consequences. In order to foresee consequences
there is required not only empirical observation of past experience,
not only deduction from already formulated concepts--as when we say that
injustice will cause hard feelings and revolt--but that rarer quality
which in the presence of a situation discerns a meaning not obvious,
suggests an idea, "injustice," to interpret the situation. Situations
are neither already labeled "unjust," nor are they obviously unjust to
the ordinary mind. Analysis into elements and rearrangement of the
elements into a new synthesis are required. This is eminently a
synthetic or "creative" activity. Further it is evident that the
activity of intelligence in considering consequences implies not only
what we call reasoning in the narrower sense but imagination and
feeling. For the consequences of an act which are of importance
ethically are consequences which are not merely to be described but are
to be imagined so vividly as to be felt, whether they are consequences
that affect ourselves or affect others.

(_b_) But it would be a very narrow intelligence that should attempt to
consider only consequences of a single proposed act without considering
also other possible acts and their consequences. The second important
characteristic of intelligence is that it considers either other means
of reaching a given end, or other ends, and by working out the
consequences of these also has the basis for deliberation and choice.
The method of "multiple working hypotheses," urged as highly important
in scientific investigation, is no less essential in the moral field. To
bring several ends into the field of consideration is the characteristic
of the intelligent, or as we often say, the open-minded man. Such
consideration as this widens the capacity of the agent and marks him
off from the creature of habit, of prejudice, or of instinct.

(_c_) Intelligence implies considering in two senses all persons
involved, that is, it means taking into account not only how an act will
affect others but also how others look at it. It is scarcely necessary
to say that this activity of intelligence cannot be cut off from its
roots in social intercourse. It is by the processes of give and take, of
stimulus and response, in a social medium that this possibility of
looking at things from a different angle is secured. And once more this
different angle