and emotions, of capacity for stimulation and response, which
presuppose society for their exercise and in turn make society possible.
There can be no question as to the reality and strength of these in both
animals and men. The bear will fight for her young more savagely than
for her life. The human mother's thoughts center far more intensely upon
her offspring than upon her own person. The man who is cut dead by all
his acquaintance suffers more than he would from hunger or physical
fear. The passion of sex frequently overmasters every instinct of
individual prudence. The majority of men face poverty and live in want;
relatively few prefer physical comfort to family ties. Aristotle's
[Greek: philia] is the oftenest quoted recognition of the emotional
basis of common life, but a statement of Kant's earlier years is
particularly happy. "The point to which the lines of direction of our
impulses converge is thus not only in ourselves, but there are besides
powers moving us in the will of others outside of ourselves. Hence arise
the moral impulses which often carry us away to the discomfiture of
selfishness, the strong law of duty, and the weaker of benevolence. Both
of these wring from us many a sacrifice, and although selfish
inclinations now and then preponderate over both, these still never fail
to assert their reality in human nature. Thus we recognize that in our
most secret motives, we are dependent upon the rule of the general
will."[67]

The "law of duty," and I believe we may add, the conception of right, do
arise objectively in the social relations as the common law assumes and
subjectively in the social instincts, emotions, and the more intimate
social consciousness which had not been worked out in the time of Kant
as it has been by recent authors. This point will receive further
treatment later, but I desire to point out in anticipation that if right
and duty have their origin in this social factor there is at least a
presumption against their being subordinate ethically to the conception
of good as we find them in certain writers. If they have independent
origin and are the outgrowth of a special aspect of life it is at least
probable that they are not to be subordinated to the good unless the
very notion of good is itself reciprocally modified by right in a way
that is not usually recognized in teleological systems.

(3) Intelligence and reason imply (_a_) considering the proposed act or
the actually perfo