m of judgment; "He
is a good man," "That is a good act." If it is less obvious in the
practical judgment, "This is the better course of action," i.e., the
course which leads to the greater good, or to the good, this is because
we fail to discern that the good in these cases is a something with
which I can identify myself, not a something which I merely possess and
keep separate from my personality. It is something I shall be rather
than have. Or if I speak of a share or participation it is a sharing in
the sense of entering into a kindred life. It is an ideal, and an ideal
for a conscious personal being can hardly be other than conscious. It
may be objected that however personal the ideal it is not on this
account necessarily social. It embodies what I would be, but does not
necessarily imply response to any other personality. This, however,
would be to overlook the analyses which recent psychology has made of
the personal. The ideal does not develop in a vacuum. It implies for one
thing individuality which is conceivable only as other individuals are
distinguished. It implies the definition of purposes, and such
definition is scarcely if ever attempted except as a possible world of
purposes is envisaged.
AEsthetic valuation is in certain respects intermediate between the
valuation of things on the one hand and the moral evaluation of acts of
persons or conscious states on the other. AEsthetic objects are in many
cases seemingly things and yet even as things they are quasi-personal;
they are viewed with a certain sympathy quite different from that which
we feel for a purely economic object. If it is a work of art the artist
has embodied his thought and feeling and the observer finds it there.
The experience is that of _Einfuehlung_. Yet we do not expect the kind of
response which we look for in friendship, nor do we take the object as
merely a factor for the guidance or control of our own action as in the
practical judgment of morality. The aesthetic becomes the object of
contemplation, not of response; of embodied meaning, not of
individuality. It is so far personal that no one of aesthetic sensibility
likes to see a thing of beauty destroyed or mistreated. The situation
in which we recognize in an object meaning and embodied feeling, or at
least find sources of stimulation which appeal to our emotions, develops
an aesthetic enhancement of conscious experience. The aesthetic value
predicate is the outcome of this pecu
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