bout it. As satisfying various wants it has a
certain kind of value. It, however, evokes no consciousness of self.
Toward the more variable, complex sort of stimuli, greater attention,
constant adjustment and readjustment, are necessary.

Objects of the first sort are treated as things, in the sense that they
do not call out any respect from us or have any intrinsic value. We
understand them through and through, manipulate them, consume them,
throw them away. We regard them as valuable only with reference to our
wants. On the other hand, objects of the second sort take their place in
a bi-focal situation. Our attention shifts alternately to their behavior
and to our response, or, conversely, from our act to their response.
This back and forth movement of attention in the case of certain of
these objects is reinforced by the fact that certain stimuli from them
or from the organism, find peculiar responses already prepared in social
instincts; gesture and language play their part. Such a bi-focal
situation as this, when completely developed, involves persons. In its
earlier stages it is the quasi-personal attitude which is found in
certain savage religious attitudes, in certain aesthetic attitudes, and
in the emotional attitudes which we all have toward many of the objects
of daily life.

Economic values arise in connection with attitudes toward things. We buy
things, we sell them. They have value just in that they gratify our
wants, but they do not compel any revision or change in wants or in the
self which wants. They represent a partial interest--or if they become
the total interest we regard them as now in the moral sphere. Values of
personal affection arise as we find a constant rapport in thought,
feeling, purpose, between the two members of our social consciousness.
The attitude is that of going along with another and thereby extending
and enriching our experiences. We enter into his ideas, range with his
imagination, kindle at his enthusiasms, sympathize with his joys or
sorrows. We may disagree with our friend's opinions, but we do not
maintain a critical attitude toward _him_, that is, toward his
fundamental convictions and attitudes. If "home is the place where, when
you have to go there, they have to take you in," as Frost puts it, a
friend is one who, when you go to him, has to accept you.

Moral values also arise in a social or personal relation--not in
relation to things. This is on the surface in the for