fected by the scientific temper of the day, but also to be subject to
a shift in interest. This may be in part a reaction from
other-worldliness. In part it may be due to loss of fervor for a
theological picture of a future heaven of a rather monotonous sort and
may signify not so much loss of interest in life as desire for a more
vital kind of continuance. It is not true that all that a man hath will
he give for his life, yet it is true that no valuing process is
intelligible that leaves out life with its impulses, emotions, and
desires as the first factor to be reckoned with.

(2) The second factor is the life in common, with its system of
relations, and its corresponding instincts, emotions, and desires.

So much has been written in recent years on the social nature of man
that it seems unnecessary to elaborate the obvious. Protest has even
been raised against the exaggeration of the social. But I believe that
in certain points at least we have not yet penetrated to the heart of
the social factor, and its significance for morals.

So far as the moral aspect is concerned I know nothing more significant
than the attitude of the Common Law as set forth by Professor Pound.[66]
This has sought to base its system of duties on relations. The relation
which was prominent in the Middle Ages was that of landlord and tenant;
other relations are those of principal and agent, of trustee, etc. An
older relation was that of kinship. The kin was held for the wergeld;
the goel must avenge his next of kin; the father must provide for
prospective parents-in-law; the child must serve the parents. Duty was
the legal term for the relation. In all this there is no romanticism, no
exaggeration of the social; there is a fair statement of the facts which
men have recognized and acted upon the world over and in all times.
Individualistic times or peoples have modified certain phases. The
Roman law sought to ground many of its duties in the contract, the will
of the parties. But covenants by no means exhaust duties. And according
to Professor Pound the whole course of English and American law today is
belying the generalization of Sir Henry Maine, that the evolution of law
is a progress from status to contract. We are shaping law of insurance,
of public service companies, not by contract but by the relation of
insurer and insured, of public utility and patron.

Psychologically, the correlate of the system of relations is the set of
instincts