ual red things; to know the meaning of
'house' we must at least have had experience of individual men and of
their physical needs. Hence 'conceptions' without 'perceptions' are
void or empty. The existence of conceptions presupposes experience of
corresponding individuals, even though it also implies the activity of
thinking in relation to these individuals.'[6]
[5] Cf. p. 29, note 1.
[6] Kant's account implies that he has in view only empirical
knowledge; in any case it only applies to empirical
conceptions.
Further, it is true to say that as perceiving we are passive; we do
not do anything. This, as has been pointed out, is the element of
truth contained in the statement that objects are _given_ to us. On
the other hand, it may be truly said that as conceiving, in the sense
of bringing an individual under a universal, we are essentially
active. This is presupposed by the notice or attention involved in
perception ordinarily so called, i. e. perception in the full sense
in which it includes conceiving as well as perceiving.[7] Kant,
therefore, is justified in referring to the sensibility as a
'receptivity' and to the understanding as a 'spontaneity'.
[7] This distinction within perception is of course
compatible with the view that the elements so distinguished
are inseparable.
The distinction, so stated, appears, as has been already said,
intelligible and, in the main[8], valid. Kant, however, renders the
elucidation of his meaning difficult by combining with this view of
the distinction an incompatible and unwarranted theory of perception.
He supposes,[9] without ever questioning the supposition, that
perception is due to the operation of things outside the mind, which
act upon our sensibility and thereby produce sensations. On this
supposition, what we perceive is not, as the distinction just stated
implies, the thing itself, but a sensation produced by it.
Consequently a problem arises as to the meaning on this supposition of
the statements 'by the sensibility objects are given to us' and 'by
the understanding they are thought'. The former statement must mean
that when a thing affects us there is a sensation. It cannot mean that
by the sensibility we know that there exists a thing which causes the
sensation, for this knowledge would imply the activity of thinking;
nor can it mean that in virtue of the sensibility the thing itself is
presented to us. The latter statement must m
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