e
accompanied by the same mental experience, and each of the two
aspects would identify, and would be evidence of, the other. There
is, therefore, nothing so thoroughly characteristic of any state of
feeling as the nature of the diffusive wave that embodies it, or
the various organs specially roused into action by it, together
with the manner of the action. The only drawback is our comparative
ignorance, and our inability to discern the precise character of
the diffusive currents in every case; a radical imperfection in the
science of mind as constituted at present.

"Our own consciousness, formerly reckoned the only medium of
knowledge to the mental philosopher, must therefore be still
referred to as a principal means of discriminating the varieties of
human feeling. We have the power of noting agreement and difference
among our conscious states, and on this we can raise a structure of
classification. We recognise such generalities as pleasure, pain,
love, anger, through the property of mental or intellectual
discrimination that accompanies in our mind the fact of emotion. A
certain degree of precision is attainable by this mode of mental
comparison and analysis; the farther we can carry such precision
the better; but that is no reason why it should stand alone to the
neglect of the corporeal embodiments through which one mind reveals
itself to others. The companionship of inward feeling with bodily
manifestation is a fact of the human constitution, and deserves to
be studied as such; and it would be difficult to find a place more
appropriate than a treatise on the mind for setting forth the
conjunctions and sequences traceable in this department of nature.
I shall make no scruple in conjoining with the description of the
mental phenomena the physical appearances, in so far as I am able
to ascertain them.

"There is still one other quarter to be referred to in settling a
complete arrangement of the emotions, namely, the varieties of
human conduct, and the machinery created in subservience to our
common susceptibilities. For example, the vast superstructure of
fine art has its foundations in human feeling, and in rendering an
account of this we are led to recognise the interesting group of
artistic or aesthetic emotions. The same outward refe