g pain
rather than pleasure--are almost devoid of sympathy; while among
ourselves, philanthropy organizes itself in laws, establishes numerous
institutions, and dictates countless private benefactions.

From which and other like facts, does it not seem an unavoidable
inference, that new emotions are developed by new experiences--new
habits of life? All are familiar with the truth that, in the individual,
each feeling may be strengthened by performing those actions which it
prompts; and to say that the feeling is _strengthened_, is to say that
it is in part _made_ by these actions. We know, further, that not
unfrequently, individuals, by persistence in special courses of conduct,
acquire special likings for such courses, disagreeable as these may be
to others; and these whims, or morbid tastes, imply incipient emotions
corresponding to these special activities. We know that emotional
characteristics, in common with all others, are hereditary; and the
differences between civilized nations descended from the same stock,
show us the cumulative results of small modifications hereditarily
transmitted. And when we see that between savage and civilized races
which diverged from one another in the remote past, and have for a
hundred generations followed modes of life becoming ever more unlike,
there exist still greater emotional contrasts; may we not infer that the
more or less distinct emotions which characterize civilized races, are
the organized results of certain daily-repeated combinations of mental
states which social life involves? Must we not say that habits not only
modify emotions in the individual, and not only beget tendencies to like
habits and accompanying emotions in descendants, but that when the
conditions of the race make the habits persistent, this progressive
modification may go on to the extent of producing emotions so far
distinct as to seem new? And if so, we may suspect that such new
emotions, and by implication all emotions analytically considered,
consist of aggregated and consolidated groups of those simpler feelings
which habitually occur together in experience. When, in the
circumstances of any race, some one kind of action or set of actions,
sensation or set of sensations, is usually followed, or accompanied, by
various other sets of actions or sensations, and so entails a large mass
of pleasurable or painful states of consciousness; these, by frequent
repetition, become so connected together that t