ntages of possessing this or that, but of the
represented advantages of possession in general--is not made up of
certain concrete representations, but of the abstracts of many concrete
representations; and so is re-representative. The higher sentiments, as
that of justice, are still more completely of this nature. Here the
sentient state is compounded out of sentient states that are themselves
wholly, or almost wholly, re-representative: it involves representations
of those lower emotions which are produced by the possession of
property, by freedom of action, etc.; and thus is re-representative in a
higher degree.

This classification, here roughly indicated and capable of further
expansion, will be found in harmony with the results of detailed
analysis aided by development. Whether we trace mental progression
through the grades of the animal kingdom, through the grades of mankind,
or through the stages of individual growth; it is obvious that the
advance, alike in cognitions and feelings, is, and must be, from the
presentative to the more and more remotely representative. It is
undeniable that intelligence ascends from those simple perceptions in
which consciousness is occupied in localizing and classifying
sensations, to perceptions more and more compound, to simple reasoning,
to reasoning more and more complex and abstract--more and more remote
from sensation. And in the evolution of feelings, there is a parallel
series of steps. Simple sensations; sensations combined together;
sensations combined with represented sensations; represented sensations
organized into groups, in which their separate characters are very much
merged; representations of these representative groups, in which the
original components have become still more vague. In both cases, the
progress has necessarily been from the simple and concrete to the
complex and abstract; and as with the cognitions, so with the feelings,
this must be the basis of classification.

The space here occupied with criticisms on Mr. Bain's work, we might
have filled with exposition and eulogy, had we thought this the more
important. Though we have freely pointed out what we conceive to be its
defects, let it not be inferred that we question its great merits. We
repeat that, as a natural history of the mind, we believe it to be
the best yet produced. It is a most valuable collection of
carefully-elaborated materials. Perhaps we cannot better express our
sense of its wort