ed to higher stages, as the thought becomes more abstract.

FEELINGS, or those modes of mind in which we are occupied, not with the
relations subsisting between our sentient states, but with the sentient
states themselves, are divisible into four parallel sub-classes.

_Presentative feelings_, ordinarily called sensations, are those mental
states in which, instead of regarding a corporeal impression as of this
or that kind, or as located here or there, we contemplate it in itself
as pleasure or pain: as when eating.

_Presentative-representative feelings_, embracing a great part of what
we commonly call emotions, are those in which a sensation, or group of
sensations, or group of sensations and ideas, arouses a vast aggregation
of represented sensations; partly of individual experience, but chiefly
deeper than individual experience, and, consequently, indefinite. The
emotion of terror may serve as an example. Along with certain
impressions made on the eyes or ears, or both, are recalled in
consciousness many of the pains to which such impressions have before
been the antecedents; and when the relation between such impressions and
such pains has been habitual in the race, the definite ideas of such
pains which individual experience has given, are accompanied by
the indefinite pains that result from inherited effects of
experiences--vague feelings which we may call organic representations.
In an infant, crying at a strange sight or sound while yet in the
nurse's arms, we see these organic representations called into existence
in the shape of dim discomfort, to which individual experience has yet
given no specific outlines.

_Representative feelings_, comprehending the ideas of the feelings above
classed, when they are called up apart from the appropriate external
excitements. As instances of these may be named the feelings with which
the descriptive poet writes, and which are aroused in the minds of his
readers.

_Re-representative feelings_, under which head are included those more
complex sentient states that are less the direct results of external
excitements than the indirect or reflex results of them. The love of
property is a feeling of this kind. It is awakened not by the presence
of any special object, but by ownable objects at large; and it is not
from the mere presence of such object, but from a certain ideal relation
to them, that it arises. As before shown (p. 253) it consists, not of
the represented adva