rther--a classification
which, while suggested by certain fundamental traits reached without a
very lengthened inquiry, is yet, we believe, in harmony with that
disclosed by detailed analysis.

Leaving out of view the Will, which is a simple homogeneous mental
state, forming the link between feeling and action, and not admitting of
subdivisions; our states of consciousness fall into two great
classes--COGNITIONS and FEELINGS.

COGNITIONS, or those modes of mind in which we are occupied with the
_relations_ that subsist among our feelings, are divisible into four
great sub-classes.

_Presentative cognitions_; or those in which consciousness is occupied
in localizing a sensation impressed on the organism--occupied, that is,
with the relation between this presented mental state and those other
presented mental states which make up our consciousness of the part
affected: as when we cut ourselves.

_Presentative-representative cognitions_; or those in which
consciousness is occupied with the relation between a sensation or group
of sensations and the representations of those various other sensations
that accompany it in experience. This is what we commonly call
perception--an act in which, along with certain impressions presented to
consciousness, there arise in consciousness the ideas of certain other
impressions ordinarily connected with the presented ones: as when its
visible form and colour, lead us to mentally endow an orange with all
its other attributes.

_Representative cognitions_; or those in which consciousness is occupied
with the relations among ideas or represented sensations; as in all acts
of recollection.

_Re-representative cognitions_; or those in which the occupation of
consciousness is not by representation of special relations that have
before been presented to consciousness; but those in which such
represented special relations are thought of merely as comprehended in a
general relation--those in which the concrete relations once
experienced, in so far as they become objects of consciousness at all,
are incidentally represented, along with the abstract relation which
formulates them. The ideas resulting from this abstraction, do not
themselves represent actual experiences; but are symbols which stand for
groups of such actual experiences--represent aggregates of
representations. And thus they may be called re-representative
cognitions. It is clear that the process of re-representation is
carri