cceptation of the word; and, as we
think, in the wrong direction. Whatever may be the interpretation that
is justified by its derivation, the word emotion has come generally to
mean that kind of feeling which is not a direct result of any action on
the organism; but is either an indirect result of such action, or arises
quite apart from such action. It is used to indicate those sentient
states which are independently generated in consciousness; as
distinguished from those generated in our corporeal framework, and known
as sensations. Now this distinction, tacitly made in common speech, is
one which Psychology cannot well reject; but one which it must adopt,
and to which it must give scientific precision. Mr. Bain, however,
appears to ignore any such distinction. Under the term emotion, he
includes not only passions, sentiments, affections, but all "feelings,
states of feeling, pleasures, pains,"--that is, all sensations. This
does not appear to be a mere lapse of expression; for when, in the
opening sentence, he asserts that "mind is comprised under the three
heads--Emotion, Volition, and Intellect," he of necessity implies that
sensation is included under one of these heads; and as it cannot be
included under volition or intellect, it must be classed with emotion;
as it clearly is in the next sentence.

We cannot but think this a retrograde step. Though distinctions which
have been established in popular thought and language, are not
unfrequently merged in the higher generalizations of science (as, for
instance, when crabs and worms are grouped together in the sub-kingdom
_Annulosa_); yet science very generally recognizes the validity of these
distinctions, as real though not fundamental. And so in the present
case. Such community as analysis discloses between sensation and
emotion, must not shut out the broad contrast that exists between them.
If there needs a wider word, as there does, to signify any sentient
state whatever; then we may fitly adopt for this purpose the word
currently so used, namely, "Feeling." And considering as Feelings all
that great division of mental states which we do not class as
Cognitions, we may then separate this great division into the two
orders, Sensations and Emotions.

* * * * *

And here we may, before concluding, briefly indicate the leading
outlines of a classification which reduces this distinction to a
scientific form, and develops it somewhat fu