n a detachment to defeat. The main Confederate army
at Centreville could, at any moment, dispatch reinforcements by
railway to the Valley, reversing the strategic movement which had won
Bull Run; while the Army of the Potomac, held fast by the mud, could
do nothing to prevent it. Banks was therefore ordered to occupy the
line Charlestown to Martinsburg, some two-and-twenty miles from
Winchester, to cover the reconstruction of the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad, and to accumulate supplies preparatory to a further
advance. The troops, however, did not approve such cautious strategy.
"Their appetite for work," according to their commander, "was very
sharp." Banks himself was not less eager. "If left to our own
discretion," he wrote to McClellan's chief of staff, "the general
desire will be to move early."

March 9.

On March 7 General D.H. Hill, acting under instructions, fell back
from Leesburg, and two days later Johnston, destroying the railways,
abandoned Centreville. The Confederate General-in-Chief had decided
to withdraw to near Orange Court House, trebling his distance from
Washington, and surrendering much territory, but securing, in return,
important strategical advantages. Protected by the Rapidan, a stream
unfordable in spring, he was well placed to meet a Federal advance,
and also, by a rapid march, to anticipate any force which might be
transported by water and landed close to Richmond.

Jackson was now left isolated in the Valley. The nearest Confederate
infantry were at Culpeper Court House, beyond the Blue Ridge, nearly
sixty miles south-east. In his front, within two easy marches, was an
army just seven times his strength, at Romney another detachment of
several thousand men, and a large force in the Alleghanies. He was in
no hurry, however, to abandon Winchester.

Johnston had intended that when the main army fell back towards
Richmond his detachments should follow suit. Jackson found a loophole
in his instructions which gave him full liberty of action.

"I greatly desire," he wrote to Johnston on March 8, "to hold this
place [Winchester] so far as may be consistent with your views and
plans, and am making arrangements, by constructing works, etc., to
make a stand. Though you desired me some time since to fall back in
the event of yourself and General Hill's doing so, yet in your letter
of the 5th inst. you say, "Delay the enemy as long as you can;" I
have felt justified in remaining here for the pres