two actually lost. It is apparent, immediately on statement, that
against commerce-destruction by blockade, the recourse of the weaker
maritime belligerent is commerce-destruction by cruisers on the high
sea. Granting equal efficiency in the use of either measure, it is
further plain that the latter is intrinsically far less efficacious.
To cut off access to a city is much more certainly accomplished by
holding the gates than by scouring the country in search of persons
seeking to enter. Still, one can but do what one can. In 1861 to 1865,
the Southern Confederacy, unable to shake off the death grip fastened
on its throat, attempted counteraction by means of the "Alabama,"
"Sumter," and their less famous consorts, with what disastrous
influence upon the navigation--the shipping--of the Union it is
needless to insist. But while the shipping of the opposite belligerent
was in this way not only crippled, but indirectly was swept from the
seas, the Confederate cruisers, not being able to establish a
blockade, could not prevent neutral vessels from carrying on the
commerce of the Union. This consequently suffered no serious
interruption; whereas the produce of the South, its inconvertible
wealth--cotton chiefly--was practically useless to sustain the
financial system and credit of the people. So, in 1812 and the two
years following, the United States flooded the seas with privateers,
producing an effect upon British commerce which, though inconclusive
singly, doubtless co-operated powerfully with other motives to dispose
the enemy to liberal terms of peace. It was the reply, and the only
possible reply, to the commercial blockade, the grinding efficacy of
which it will be a principal object of these pages to depict. The
issue to us has been accurately characterized by Mr. Henry Adams, in
the single word "Exhaustion."[390]

Both parties to the War of 1812 being conspicuously maritime in
disposition and occupation, while separated by three thousand miles of
ocean, the sea and its navigable approaches became necessarily the
most extensive scene of operations. There being between them great
inequality of organized naval strength and of pecuniary resources,
they inevitably resorted, according to their respective force, to one
or the other form of maritime hostilities against commerce which have
been indicated. To this procedure combats on the high seas were merely
incidental. Tradition, professional pride, and the combative spir