ties, such and such methods of warfare are
barred; but all these are merely guaranteed exceptions to the general
rule that every individual of each nation is the enemy of those of the
opposing belligerent.

Canada and the Canadians, being British subjects, became therefore,
however involuntarily, the enemies of the United States, when the
latter decided that the injuries received from Great Britain compelled
recourse to the sword. Moreover, war, once determined, must be waged
on the principles of war; and whatever greed of annexation may have
entered into the motives of the Administration of the day, there can
be no question that politically and militarily, as a war measure, the
invasion of Canada was not only justifiable but imperative. "In case
of war," wrote the United States Secretary of State, Monroe, a very
few days[396] before the declaration, "it might be necessary to invade
Canada; not as an object of the war, but as a means to bring it to a
satisfactory conclusion." War now is never waged for the sake of mere
fighting, simply to see who is the better at killing people. The
warfare of civilized nations is for the purpose of accomplishing an
object, obtaining a concession of alleged right from an enemy who has
proved implacable to argument. He is to be made to yield to force what
he has refused to reason; and to do that, hold is laid upon what is
his, either by taking actual possession, or by preventing his
utilizing what he still may retain. An attachment is issued, so to
say, or an injunction laid, according to circumstances; as men in law
do to enforce payment of a debt, or abatement of an injury. If, in the
attempt to do this, the other nation resists, as it probably will,
then fighting ensues; but that fighting is only an incident of war.
War, in substance, though not perhaps in form, began when the one
nation resorted to force, quite irrespective of the resistance of the
other.

Canada, conquered by the United States, would therefore have been a
piece of British property attached; either in compensation for claims,
or as an asset in the bargaining which precedes a treaty of peace. Its
retention even, as a permanent possession, would have been justified
by the law of war, if the military situation supported that course.
This is a political consideration; militarily, the reasons were even
stronger. To Americans the War of 1812 has worn the appearance of a
maritime contest. This is both natural and just; fo